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People disagree about key societal issues in the face of compelling scienti￿c evidence. Such disagreements have
signi￿cant societal impacts not only with regard to decision making (e.g., whether to vaccinate children) but also
with regard to political polarization between groups. Why do seemingly intractable disagreements about policy arise?
According to the “Identity-protective Cognition Thesis” (ICT), the answer is that human reasoning is negatively a￿ected
when new information threatens prior beliefs and values. In a previous study with American participants, Kahan et al.
[2017] found support for this hypothesis. People with high numeracy seem to use their reasoning skills selectively:
when the topic about which they were asked to exercise their reasoning skills was unrelated to their political identities
(whether a skin cream cured rashes), high-numeracy liberals and conservatives both performed well. However, when
the topic was related to their political identities (whether gun control is e￿ective policy), high-numeracy liberals tended
to successfully exercise their capabilities only when the evidence suggested that gun control is e￿ective, whereas
high-numeracy conservatives tended to successfully exercise their capabilities only when the evidence suggested that
gun control is not e￿ective. It may not be surprising that responses became politically polarized when answering
questions about a gun-control ban, but what was remarkable in Kahan et al. [2017] was that polarization was higher
among high-numeracy individual than among low-numeracy individuals. This suggests that the quantitative reasoning
skills of participants with high numeracy skills can become suppressed, which portends starker disagreement between
more numerate partisans than between less numerate partisans.
In this study we investigated whether a similar result can be found in a Western European sample of participants,
and for a di￿erent controversial topic (migration policies).1 In addition, we were interested to see whether encouraging
active reasoning in one of two ways might mitigate the e￿ect. We thus examine the following two research questions:
RQ1: Do some active reasoning interventions do a better job than others at improving numeric reasoning overall?
RQ2: Can we replicate the polarizing e￿ect of identity-protective cognition on numeracy for a di￿erent controversial
topic in a di￿erent population?
Here is the plan for this paper: in Section 2, we contextualize our study in the published literature on motivated
numeracy and active reasoning. Then, in Section 3 we explain the methodology used for the current study. In Section 4,
we lay out our results and address RQ1 and RQ2. Finally, in Section 5 we discuss limitations of the current study and
explore opportunities for future work on this important topic.
2 RELATEDWORK
In this section we summarize the extant research in the area of motivated numeracy. We also explain our use of active
reasoning inductions, and why we believe such inductions may help temper the ill e￿ects of motivated numeracy. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the ￿rst study to investigate the e￿ect of active reasoning interventions on motivated
numeracy.
2.1 Motivated Numeracy
Motivated numeracy is a species within the larger genus of motivated cognition. The overarching category includes
processes and dispositions related to seeking out evidence, trusting and distrusting sources of information, interpreting
evidence and counter-evidence, weighting competing criteria in decision-making, remembering information, noticing
1The pre-registration for this study is available at https://osf.io/65z4h. We ended up diverging from several details of the pre-registration, which we note
when relevant below.





















































Motivated Numeracy and Active Reasoning in a Western European Sample 3
inferential connections, and so on. Much motivated cognition is normatively unobjectionable, even desirable. There is
nothing wrong with people seeking out information related to topics and issues they care about rather than those they
do not. Additionally, if someone lacks epistemic motivation entirely, they are unlikely to engage in inquiry. However,
motivated reasoning can turn vicious when it leads people to disregard or misinterpret – for identity-protective reasons
– key evidence that they would otherwise be well-positioned to process.
Motivated numeracy speci￿cally crops up in those cases in which people need to exercise their learned capacity to
interpret data, tables, and ￿gures. In such a context, there is typically a clear right answer dictated by the evidence. This
makes the study of motivated numeracy more interpretable than the study of, for instance, risk perception. When social
scientists such as Kahan et al. [2005] study attitudes towards new technologies like nanoparticles, it is often di￿cult
even for experts to say exactly how the risks and bene￿ts should be weighed against one another. If some people focus
more on the risks while others focus more on the bene￿ts, they may come to di￿erent conclusions and yet both be
reasoning unobjectionably. Indeed, Alfano [2019] argues that the same person may come to opposite evaluations if they
approach the evidence ￿rst skeptically, then in a trusting mode. When it comes to interpreting a graph or a contingency
table, though, there is a de￿nitive correct answer. This means that researchers can use numeracy tasks to examine not
just faultless di￿erences in risk-aversion but outright errors in reasoning, which brings us to Kahan et al. [2017].
Participants in Kahan and colleagues’ study were presented with a contingency table like the one pictured in Figure 1.
The table represented either the results of a (￿ctional) pharmaceutical study or the results of a (￿ctional) policy on gun
control. In addition, some participants saw a contingency table that indicated that the skin cream (gun control policy)
was e￿ective, while others saw a table that indicated that the cream (policy) was ine￿ective. The key to interpreting a
table like this is to compare not the absolute numbers but the conditional probabilities. For instance, the table pictured
here indicates that 223 out of 298 patients who used the cream got better (74.8 percent), whereas 107 out of the 128
patients who did not use the cream got better (83.6 percent). Thus, even though more patients who used the cream got
better, the likelihood of getting better given that one used the cream was lower than the likelihood of getting better
given that one did not.
Kahan et al. [2017] found that higher-numeracy participants were better able to interpret the contingency table than
lower-numeracy participants. In the skin cream conditions, participants’ political partisanship had no e￿ect on their
responses. However, in the gun control conditions, partisan participants tended to answer correctly only when they
saw ideologically-friendly data: high-numeracy liberal Democrats gave the correct answer primarily when the table
suggested that gun control worked, whereas conservative Republicans gave the correct answer primarily when the table
suggested that gun control did not work. Moreover, polarization was more evident between high-numeracy partisans
than between low-numeracy partisans. Kahan and colleagues explain these results, and in particular the polarization, as
stemming from identity-protective cognition. Essentially, the idea is that identity-related commitments (e.g., to minimal
regulation of ￿rearms or to strong regulation of ￿rearms) can bump up against the facts, and that when such clashes
occur people tend to hold tight to their commitments and ignore or misinterpret the facts.
To our knowledge, there have been ￿ve attempts to reproduce this result – some direct replications, others conceptual
replications. First, Ballarini and Sloman [2017] conducted a small-scale (N=55) replication and extension. Though they
did not ￿nd evidence of a motivated numeracy e￿ect, the very low statistical power of this study and the fact that almost
all participants were politically liberal suggest that it should not be accorded much evidential weight. Second, Kahan and
Peters [2017] report a successful direct replication of the original study with a large (N=1596), demographically diverse
sample of participants, though of course replications by di￿erent labs are even more persuasive than self-replications.
Third, Washburn and Skitka [2018] (N=1347) replicate and extend the original result by showing that it crops up for both






















































Fig. 1. Example stimulus . This represents the rash condition
conservatives and liberals across a range of controversial issues, including not only gun control but also health-care
reform, nuclear power, and same-sex marriage. Fourth, Khanna and Sood [2018] conducted three studies – all using
some form of ￿rearms regulation as the controversy – that again replicated the original ￿nding. Finally, Nurse and
Grant [2019] conducted a conceptual replication with Australian participants (N=504) using anthropogenic climate
change rather than gun control as the controversial topic; this conceptual replication also succeeded in ￿nding the
e￿ect of motivated numeracy.
Thus, to date, all but one of the studies of motivated numeracy have involved participants from the United States.
Direct replications will presumably continue to employ American participants, since gun control is not nearly as
controversial in the vast majority of other countries as it is in the States. In addition, all ￿ve of these replication studies
used a unidimensional measure of political ideology, along the traditional left-right spectrum. While the unidimensional
measure is adequate for many purposes, we suspect that it may obscure some interesting di￿erences. For that reason,
in the current study we chose to use Kahan et al. [2007]’s two-dimensional measure of ideology. As we explain in
more detail below, this scale employs two orthogonal dimensions: hierarchy-egalitarianism (H-E) and individualism-
communitarianism (I-C). TheH-E subscale measures the respondent’s attitude towards vertically-structured hierarchies,
such as are seen in the military, the church, and most large corporations. The I-C subscale measures the respondent’s
attitude towards group solidarity. So, for example, someone who scores high onH-E but low on I-Cwould be supportive
of a society characterized by steep hierarchy and strong communal obligations enforced by governmental regulation,
whereas someone who scores high on both subscales would be supportive of a society characterized by steep hierarchy
and unregulated communal obligations. Traditional left-right partisan measures tend to con￿ate these two dimensions.





















































Motivated Numeracy and Active Reasoning in a Western European Sample 5
2.2 Active Reasoning
Critical thinking – and avoiding the ill e￿ects of motivated reasoning – is a highly valued skill but a di￿cult one to
teach or nurture. Unfortunately, critical thinking is a skill that is often missing even among people holding a degree in a
scienti￿c ￿eld of study [Shtulman 2013]. It is di￿cult to undermine unfounded beliefs by simply pointing out alternative
explanations. Indeed, trying to correct such beliefs might even strengthen people’s initial beliefs [Lewandowsky et al.
2012; Nguyen et al. 2007]. In particular, such back￿ring is liable to occur when the argument threatens someone’s
identity or falls outside the boundaries of what they consider acceptable.
One way to address this problem is to present information with su￿cient support and guidance. Additionally, it
is crucial to support critical thinking early, as it is most likely to exert an in￿uence at the time of message expo-
sure [Lewandowsky et al. 2012].
Extant research documents encouraging evidence for various active reasoning approaches that support critical
thinking. In the classroom, an e￿ective method to foster active reasoning has been to ask students to themselves
generate counter-arguments for unfounded beliefs [Miller and Wozniak 2001]. Teaching such active reasoning skills and
pointing out ￿awed argumentation techniques used by providers of misinformation has also been shown to be e￿ective
to reduce belief in false information [Cook et al. 2017]. The results suggested a slight increase in item acceptance. Other
work introduced a light-weight but e￿ective protocol for supporting debate in a classroom activity with university
students. The ￿ndings suggest that this intervention led to a statistically signi￿cant belief change, and that this change
was in the direction of the position best supported by scienti￿c evidence. However, the intervention combined several
aspects (including exposure to a lecture on critical thinking, and seeing the arguments of peers), which does not allow
us to draw conclusions about the e￿ects of individual aspects [Holzer et al. 2018].
Further, some authors argue that online debate could reduce beliefs in pseudoscienti￿c claims [Holzer et al. 2015;
Tsai et al. 2015], possibly leveraging the fact that arguments from peers can be more persuasive than those coming
from more authoritative ￿gures [Garrett 2011]. In this vien, rbutr is a software solution that sca￿olds peer debates on
controversial information right where it appears.2 It does so by allowing users to post and rate rebuttals for web pages
through a browser plugin. In this way, any web page can become a live debate platform. This is in line with a view that
there should be a World Wide Argument Web, connecting arguments with each other online (see Schneider et al. [2013]
for a review).
In light of this previous work, we posit that a procedure that encourages active reasoning could decrease the extent
that identity-protective cognition manifests. To clarify this issue, we designed a replication study measuring identity-
protective cognition with two active reasoning manipulations (one with online argumentation, the other using online
search).
3 EXPERIMENT
This experiment is a conceptual replication of the study by Kahan et al. [2017].
3.1 Stimulus
As in the original study, the stimulus consisted of four versions of a problem involving the interpretation of data
and causal inference. Those results were reported in a two-by-two contingency table, the columns of which speci￿ed
2http://rbutr.com, retrieved August 2019






















































the number of cases that re￿ected positive and negative results, respectively, and the rows of which re￿ected the
experimental treatment (see Figure 1). These were on two di￿erent topics: Medicine and Policy.
Medicine. For the skin rash treatment topic, there were two of the versions of the experiment. These two versions
di￿ered only in terms of which result they supported. This meant that labels at the tops of the columns (“Rash got
better” vs. “Rash got worse”) in the table were reversed. The contingency table below the labels describes a number
of patients su￿ering from skin rashes, where some have received treatment and others have not. The table indicates
how many patients got better, and the participant is asked to indicate either that “the people who used the skin cream
were more likely to get better than those who didn’t” or that “the people who use the skin cream were more likely to
get worse than those who didn’t. These stimuli are identical to those used in the original Kahan et al. [2017] study.
Policy. Two conditions of the experiment involved a new immigration policy. The contingency table describes the
e￿ectiveness of a strict new immigration policy; in one condition, the stricter policy is e￿ective, in the other not.
The table indicates the number of people whose level of radicalization decreased and the number whose level of
radicalization increased. The wording was kept as comparable as possible to the original Kahan et al. study:
Terrorism researchers have developed a new policy for identifying radicalization in recent immigrants.
New policies often work but sometimes lead to additional radicalization. Even when policies don’t work,
radicalization sometimes decreases and sometimes increases randomly. As a result, it is necessary to test
any new policy in an experiment to see whether it leads to more or less radicalization. Researchers have
conducted an experiment on recent immigrants at risk of radicalization. In the experiment, one group of
border security o￿cers applied a stricter entrance policy and a second group did not apply the stricter
entrance policy. For each group, the number of people whose level of radicalization decreased and the
number whose level of radicalization increased are recorded in the table below. Because security o￿cers
do not always complete studies, the total number of participants in each of the two groups is not exactly
the same, but this does not prevent assessment of the results. Please indicate whether the experiment shows
that using the strict new policy is likely to make radicalization decrease or increase.
3.2 Procedure
In a between-subjects design participants were assigned to one out of 8 conditions (2 by 2 by 2 design):
• Result polarity (2): intervention caused improvement, intervention caused decline
• Topic (2): medical treatment, immigration policy
• Active reasoning (2): browser search, rbutr
Participants ￿rst supplied basic demographic information. Then they were asked to spend some time on actively and
critically researching their topic (medical treatment or immigration policy), e.g.,“Do modern medical treatments work?
How e￿ective are they? What strengths or ￿aws do they have?”
Depending on the condition, participants were either asked to use the rbutr website, or to use their preferred method
for ￿nding information online. The rbutr system is a website and plugin where users supply links to articles that “rebut”
or argue against the points made in other articles. The active control is described in the following way: “To answer
these questions, please use your preferred method for getting information online. Please spend approximately 10 minutes
searching, reading, or watching videos to learn about the quality of medical research.” Both active reasoning interventions
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were accompanied by a 10 minute timer that prevented participants from moving to the next stage before they had
done some research.
Next, participants completed a questionnaire about their political a￿liation (see Section 3.2.1) and a questionnaire
assessing their Numeracy skills (see Section 3.2.2). The experiment was concluded with a free text comment box for
remaining questions or comments from participants.
3.2.1 Political orientation. The Kahan et al. study that we are replicating used self-reports on the continuum between
conservative Republican and liberal Democrat. To broaden the study to European political views, we used a questionnaire
containing two validated scales to measure political a￿liation [Kahan 2012]. In this questionnaire, participants indicate
the level of their disagreement or agreement with each item on a Likert response measure. Responses are then aggregated
(with appropriate reverse-coding of the “E” and “C” items) to form continuous “Hierarchy - egalitarianism” (H-E, 13
items) and “Individualism - communitarianism” (I-C, 17 items) worldview scores. Here is an example item from the I-C
scale associated with high individualism: "People who are successful in business have a right to enjoy their wealth
as they see ￿t." And here is an example item from the H-E scale associated with high hierarchy: “It seems like the
criminals and welfare cheats get all the breaks, while the average citizen picks up the tab.” A full list of items can be
found in Kahan et al. [2007].
3.2.2 Numeracy. To assess Numeracy competence, participants completed the questions in a validated numeracy
questionnaire [Weller et al. 2013]. Questions range in di￿culty to make it possible to distinguish between participants
with various levels of numeracy. A relatively easy question is, "In the ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES, the chance
of winning a car is 1 in 1000. What percent of tickets of ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES win a car?" A relatively
di￿cult question is, "Which of the following numbers represents the biggest risk of getting a disease? (1 in 12 or 1 in
37)."
4 RESULTS
All analyses were conducted in R [Core Team 2018]. Following Kahan and colleagues, primary analyses used multiple
imputation to handle missingness (the maximum amount of missingness for any variable used was 7 missing responses
for two items within the Individualism-Collectivism scale, less than 1 percent missing). Multiple imputation was
performed using the ’mice’ R package [van Buuren and Groothuis-Oudshoorn 2011], and type-II Analyses of Variance
(ANOVAs) were performed using the ’miceadds’ R package [Robitzsch et al. 2018].3
4.1 Participants
Participants were recruited on the Proli￿c platform, with a ￿lter for participants registered as British or Dutch to
ensure a European sample with high English comprehension. In total, 746 participants completed the study (61 percent
female).4 The majority (68 percent) were British, and a small minority (2 percent) were Dutch, though 28 percent did
not specify a nationality. The mean age was 34.75 (StD = 11.61). The majority of participants had either completed a
College (227) or a Bachelors degree (294), but there were participants at Elementary school level (7), High school (111),
Masters (90), and PhD/JD/MD (17). The mean numeracy score was 5.37 (StD=1.56) out of a maximum of 7.
3All code is available at the OSF website associated with this project: https://osf.io/59uv7/?view_only=a4d7c4bc42a8475f9c40a0d24cf66313.
4This was fewer than the target of 1600 participants in our pre-registration. Unfortunately, we ran out of money to pay participants and so were not able
to collect the full sample.























































We ￿rst investigated whether numeracy skills were di￿erent based on mean-splits of political scores. Welch Two Sample
t-tests indicated that numeracy scores di￿ered between high and low scorers on H-E (p< 0.001, Cohen’s d = 0.28) and
high and low scorers on I-C (p< 0.001, Cohen’s d = 0.27). In each case more liberal participants (who scored below the
mean on the political scales) scored higher on numeracy.
4.3 RQ1: Do some active reasoning interventions do a be￿er job than others at improving numeric
reasoning overall?
Overall, participants selected the correct interpretation of the data table only 43 percent of the time, which was
signi￿cantly lower than chance, .95 CI = [.39, .46]. This is similar to the result in Kahan et al. [2017], who found 41
percent correct interpretation.
To test whether the active reasoning manipulation a￿ected the accuracy of responses, we ￿t a logistic regression
predicting correct responses (1 = correct, 0 = incorrect) from a dummy indicating condition (1 = active reasoning
manipulation, 0 = control). Active reasoning condition had no signi￿cant e￿ect on response accuracy, b = 0.09, SE = 0.15,
t(741.9) = 0.62, p = 0.53. Moreover, there were also no signi￿cant two-way interaction e￿ects between active reasoning
and topic or result polarity, and no three-way active reasoning by topic by polarity interaction (all p > 0.16).
These results suggest that there is no signi￿cant di￿erence in the two active reasoning interventions, however there
were some issues with the used platform (Rbutr) which are addressed in the discussion. Given the similar performance
across the active reasoning interventions, we also collapsed across these two conditions in further analyses. We also
compared whether the topic manipulation (medicine and policy) a￿ected accuracy of responses. The average number
of correct responses was lower for the policy topic (40 percent) compared to the medicine topic (45 percent), but this
di￿erence was not statistically signi￿cant (p = 0.16).
4.4 RQ2: Can we replicate the polarizing e￿ect of identity-protective cognition on numeracy for a
di￿erent controversial topic in a di￿erent population?
Based on the ￿ndings of Kahan et al. [2017], we hypothesized that individuals’ political orientations would interact with
topic (medicine vs. policy) and result polarity (intervention leads to increase vs. decrease in rashes/radicalization) in
determining the probability of correct responses among individuals higher in numerical reasoning ability. Speci￿cally,
we hypothesized that liberal-leaning respondents high in numerical reasoning ability would be more likely to respond
correctly when the data supported a more liberal policy stance (i.e., when the stricter entrance policy increased
radicalization), while more conservative-leaning respondents high in numerical reasoning would be more likely to
respond correctly in the policy condition when the data supported a more conservative political stance (i.e., when
the stricter entrance policy decreased radicalization). By contrast, we expected that in the medicine condition, result
polarity would have no e￿ect on response accuracy, regardless of respondents’ ideology or numeracy. This hypothesis
entails a predicted four-way interaction: topic by polarity by respondent numeracy by respondent political ideology.
To test this hypothesis, we ￿t two separate logistic regression models predicting correct responses from a dummy
indicating the topic (0 = medicine, 1 = policy), a dummy indicating response polarity (0 = intervention decreases outcome,
1 = intervention increases outcome), respondents’ numeracy scores, and respondents’ political ideology (one model
used H-E scores for political ideology, the other model used I-C scores). Following Kahan and colleagues, we modelled
both numeracy and political ideology as continuous variables, and also modelled non-linear e￿ects of numeracy by




















































































Fig. 2. Predicted probabilities of answering correctly for each topic and polarity type by H-E scores (le￿ panel) and by I-C scores
(right panel)
including the squared term of numeracy in each model, as well as its interactions with the experimental conditions.
Each model was therefore identical to Kahan and colleagues’ full model, withH-E and I-C scores, respectively, standing
in as measures of respondents’ political ideology.
For each model, we performed type-II ANOVAs to test each main and interaction e￿ect. Results suggested that
the four-way interaction was not signi￿cant in either the H-E model, F(1,721.7) = 0.24, p = 0.62, partial eta-squared =
.0003, or the I-C model, F(1,723.8) = 0.04, p = 0.84, partial eta-squared = .00007. We therefore did not fully conceptually
replicate Kahan and colleagues’ results.
However, our results did provide some support for a weaker version of the identity-protective cognition hypothesis.
Speci￿cally, ANOVA results indicated signi￿cant three-way interactions between topic, polarity, and political ideology
in both the H-E, F(1,721.7) = 4.66, p = 0.03, partial eta-squared = .006, and I-C models F(1,723.8) = 4.26, p = 0.04, partial
eta-squared = .006. Figure 2 displays the predicted probabilities of answering correctly for each topic and polarity type.5
Consistent with a motivated numeracy account, more egalitarian and collectivist respondents were generally more
likely to select the correct answer, but when results ran counter to an egalitarian world-view – the policy/decrease
condition, in which stricter border policies led to reduced radicalization – more egalitarian and collectivist respondents
became less likely to select the correct answer, and more hierarchical and individualistic respondents became more
likely to select the correct answer.
No other interaction e￿ects were signi￿cant in either model, but we did observe a main e￿ect of numeracy in both
the H-E model, F(1, 721.7) = 7.44, p = 0.006, partial eta-squared = .01, and the I-C model, F(1,723.8) = 6.77, p = 0.009,
partial eta-squared = .01, with more numerate respondents more likely to give the correct answer. There was also a
signi￿cant main e￿ect of political ideology in the I-C model, F(1,723.8) = 7.81, p = .005, partial eta-squared = .01, with
more liberal/collectivistic respondents more likely overall to select the correct response. Political ideology was not a
5In our pre-registration, we indicated that we would produce additional visualizations based on the ones in Kahan and colleagues’ paper. However, we
found these overly complex and di￿cult for readers – and the authors! – to interpret, so we have left them out of this paper.






















































signi￿cant predictor in the H-E model, F(1, 721.7) = 2.06, p = 0.15, partial eta-squared = .002. Predicted probabilities of























Political ideology (H-E or I-C)
Liberal Conservative
-1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
H-E model
I-C model
Fig. 3. Predicted probabilities of correct answer by numeracy (with ideology set to its mean) and political ideology (with numeracy
set to its mean) from models using H-E (black lines) and I-C (red dashed lines) as the measure of political ideology.
5 DISCUSSION
The main ￿nding of this study is that a motivated numeracy e￿ect can be conceptually reproduced in a Western
European sample using immigration policy rather than gun control as the controversial topic. In addition, we ￿nd
that both the H-E and the I-C dimensions of political orientation are associated with this motivated numeracy e￿ect.
However, we were not able to reproduce the four-way interaction (involving greater polarization among high-numeracy
than low-numeracy participants) indicative of increased polarization among high-numeracy partisans. This may be due
to di￿erences between the American participants in the original study and our European participants, to the di￿erence
between the gun control controversy and the immigration controversy, or to some other (set of) factor(s). We also note
that there is evidence that high-numeracy partisans tend to place di￿erent evaluative emphasis on the same conditional
probabilities [Van Boven et al. 2019], which might partially explain our results. That said, we also found no evidence of
convergence among high-numeracy participants with opposing ideologies – that is to say, we found no evidence that
being high in numeracy led to reduced polarization, which is what one might naively hope for. In addition, we found no
evidence that di￿erent active reading inductions mitigated the motivated numeracy e￿ect di￿erently.
In the replicated paper, Kahan and colleagues pit the "science comprehension thesis" (SCT) against the "identity-
protective cognition thesis" (ICT). Strictly speaking, these are not inconsistent. Problems in public discourse and
deliberation could be due to multiple causes, including both poor overall science comprehension and identity-protective
cognition on the part of those who would otherwise be well-positioned to understand and interpret scienti￿c evidence.
Our results suggest that both may be in play. The participants who were low in numeracy would have done better
to ￿ip a coin than to trust their own reasoning. The participants higher in numeracy did slightly better than chance,
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but showed signs of identity-protective cognition and resulting polarization. Together, these results suggest that both
improving education and dampening the e￿ects of identity-protective cognition are worth pursuing.
We conclude by discussing the prospects of active reasoning inductions, several limitations of the current study, and
directions for future research.
5.1 Active reasoning
Motivated numeracy about politically contentious issues presents a serious challenge to democratic deliberation and
decision making. In this study, we compared two active reasoning inductions to see whether either was more successful
than the other at mitigating the motivated numeracy e￿ect: inviting participants to use their own preferred method
of information-seeking about the topic versus using the rbutr interface. The results were inconclusive. We found no
evidence that either approach is more e￿ective than the other.
In both conditions participants displayed the motivated numeracy e￿ect, at a similar level as the original study.
This suggests that the failure to replicate the 4-way interaction of polarity, topic, numeracy, and ideology is not easily
explain by the presence of (some form of) active reasoning for all conditions. That is, active reasoning did not improve
numeric reasoning directly, although a more complex interaction may have occurred.
This could be due to any number of causes. For instance, several participants in the rbutr condition reported that the
interface was hard to use or broke down. We hold out hope that a di￿erent active reasoning induction may help to
mitigate the motivated reasoning e￿ect.
5.2 Limitations
Our study has several limitations. First, as mentioned above, numeracy and political orientation were confounded for
both ideology subscales. Participants with egalitarian (communitarian) politics tended to score higher on the numeracy
scale than those with hierarchical (individualist) politics. A follow-up study using strati￿ed sampling would address
this limitation. Second, we deviated from our pre-registered data collection plan. In the pre-registration, we aimed to
collect data from 1600 participants. In the end, we could only a￿ord to collect data from 746 participants. This is still a
sizable dataset, but with a larger sample we may have been able to detect a potential four-way interaction as in Kahan
et al.’s original study – though it is worth pointing out that the four-way interaction was nowhere near the threshold
for statistical signi￿cance in our data.
5.3 Future directions
We close on a pessimistic and skeptical note about the prospects of dampening identity-protective cognition. In their
original paper, Kahan and colleagues suggest that this is possible, and point to a book review by [Kahan et al. 2006] of
Sunstein [2005] as providing a method for overcoming identity-protectiveness. However, that method turns out to be
self-a￿rmation exercises, which were ￿rst developed in the context of responding to stereotype threat [Cohen et al.
2000]. Alas, the literature on stereotype threat seems to not to be replicating well [Flore and Wicherts 2014; Paulette
et al. 2019], which indicates that self-a￿rmation is a solution in search of a problem. Of course, this does not mean
that self-a￿rmation cannot be the solution to a di￿erent problem. Does self-a￿rmation dampen identity-protective
cognition? Further research is needed to shed light on this question.
We are more enticed, though, by the prospect of using identity itself to dampen identity-protective cognition.
Paradoxical as this might sound, it seems quite promising. The way this would work is by cultivating identities that
incorporate epistemic aims (e.g., accuracy, reliability, reasonableness). Someone who embodies such an identity would






















































presumably ￿nd it threatening to employ lazy heuristics [Van Bavel and Pereira 2018]. More research is needed on this
proposal.
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